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Abstract
Secure communication is a matter of genuine concern that includes means
whereby entities can share information without a third party’s interception.
Key agreement protocols are one of the common approaches in which two or
more parties can agree upon a key, which precludes undesired third parties from
forcing a key choice on them. Over the past decade, chaos-based key agreement
protocols have been studied and employed widely. Recently, Yoon and Jeon
proposed a novel key agreement protocol based on chaotic maps and claimed
security and practicality for their protocol. We find that Yoon-Jeon’s protocol
suffers certain issues: (1) It introduces a trusted third party whose very pres-
ence increases the implementation cost. (2) requires a multiplicity of encryp-
tion/decryption computations and (3) does not protect the user’s anonymity. In
order to overcome these problems, we present an enhanced key agreement pro-
tocol with user anonymity. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that the proposed
protocol is efficient and resists current attacks.
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1. Introduction
Over the last few decades, chaos-based cryptography has been studied ex-
tensively. A chaotic system is associated with particular properties such as
sensitivity to parameters and initial conditions, pseudo-randomness, and er-
godicity. These properties fulfill several certain features such as diffusion and
confusion that are required in modern cryptography. The sensitivity to ini-
tial conditions and pseudo-randomness of Chebyshev map makes it prominently
used in encryption schemes, hash functions, and particularly in key agreement
protocols. A key agreement protocol is a protocol in which two or more com-
munication parties create a shared key by using the messages they have sent
to one another. Then, this shared key, called a session key, will be used for
information encryption/decryption in subsequent communications. Whitefield
Diffie and Martin Hellman [1] developed and then registered the first key agree-
ment protocol. However, their protocol failed to provide mutual authentication
between communication parties, and, therefore, was vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attack. Since then, several key agreement protocols have been designed
to prevent man-in-the-middle and related attacks.
Kocarev and Tasev [2] proposed a public-key encryption scheme based on
chaotic maps. Bergamo et al. [3] pointed out that Kocarev-Tasev’s presented
protocol is insecure, due to the cosine function periodicity, an adversary is able
to recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext without any required secret
key. Xiao et al. [4] designed a novel key agreement protocol upon which Han
in 2008 [5] presented two attacks that enables an adversary to prevent the user
and the server from establishing a shared key. Furthermore, Xiang et al. [6]
pointed out that Xiao et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the stolen-verifier attack
and the off-line password guessing attack. Later, Han and Chang [7] presented
an enhanced protocol, which worked with or without clock synchronization.
In 2010, Wang and Zhao [8] proposed a modified chaos-based protocol. Yoon
and Jeon [9] proved that Wang-Zhao’s protocol requires timestamp information
and is vulnerable to illegal message modification attacks. In addition, it has
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redundant encryption/decryption computations so as to establish a secure key
agreement protocol.
It is noteworthy, that none of these protocols is able to protect the anonymity
of users over communication channels, whereas in many fields such as electronic
commerce, electronic banking and remote Telecare Medicine Information Sys-
tems, users should retain their privacy while communicating with the servers.
Therefore, in 2009, Tseng et al. [10] presented the first key agreement protocol
with user anonymity. Later, Niu and Wang [11] pointed out that it fails to
provide user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and security against an insider
attacker, then proposed a new key agreement protocol. Soon, Yoon [12] proved
that Niu-Wang’s protocol is vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attack and
is fraught with computational problems. Tseng and Jou [13] suggested a key
agreement protocol based on chaotic maps, which allows users to interact with
the server anonymously. Over the recent years, key agreement schemes using
smart cards have received a lot of attention. Das [14] proposed a protocol us-
ing smart cards, and claimed immunity to attacks. However, Lee and Hsu [15]
showed it vulnerability to privileged insider attack and off-line password guess-
ing attack and inability to protect the identity of users which resulted in a new
modified protocol. Moreover, Lee et al. [15] proposed a protocol using smart
cards but unfortunately, He et al. proved that Lee et als protocol is vulnerable
to privileged insider attack, Denial of Service attack, and fails to protect the
anonymity of users and as a result proposed a new protocol [16].
In this paper, first, we offer a review of Yoon-Jeon’s protocol and examine
its failure to protect the identity of users while determining a shared session key,
redundant encryption/decryption computations and trusted third party whose
presence causes delay, sensitivity, and cost increase in a network. We propose
an enhanced key agreement protocol to overcome these problems.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a description of the
Chebyshev chaotic map, Logistic chaotic map, and the Chinese remainder the-
orem. In section 3, we study Yoon-Jeon’s key agreement protocol. In section 4,
we introduce a novel, secure key agreement protocol with user anonymity and
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then analyze the security and efficiency of the proposed protocol in section 5.
Finally, we conclude in section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some concepts used in our protocol, such as the
Chebyshev chaotic map, the Logistic chaotic map, and the Chinese remainder
theorem.
2.1. Chebyshev chaotic map
Definition 1. Let n be an integer and x a variable over the interval
[−1, 1]. The
degree-n Chebyshev polynomial for x, is defined using the following recurrence
relation:
Tn(x) = 2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x), (1)
where n ≥ 2, T0(x) = 1 and T1(x) = x. Some examples of Chebyshev polyno-
mials are:
T2(x) = 2x
2 − 1, (2)
T3(x) = 4x
3 − 3x, (3)
T4(x) = 8x
4 − 8x2 + 1. (4)
Definition 2. Let n be an integer and x a variable over the interval
[ − 1, 1].
The polynomial Tn(x) =
[− 1, 1]  [− 1, 1], is used as:
Tn(x) = cos(n arccos(x)), (5)
Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent. Chebyshev Polynomials have two impor-
tant properties, they are semi-group and chaotic.
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Definition 3. The semi-group property: One of the most important properties
of Chebyshev polynomials is the semi-group property, which is defined with:
Tr(Ts(x)) = Ts(Tr(x)) = Trs(x), (6)
Definition 4. The chaotic property: If the degree n > 1, Chebyshev polynomial
map Tn(x) = [−1, 1]  [−1, 1] is a chaotic map with invariant density f(x) =
1
pi
√
1−x2 for positive Lyapunov exponent λ = lnn.
Definition 5. Enhanced Chebyshev polynomial: Zhang [17] proved that the
semi-group property holds true for Chebyshev polynomials in the interval (−∞,+∞).
Enhanced Chebyshev polynomials are defined as:
Tn(x) = 2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x)(mod(N)), (7)
where, n ≥ 2, x ∈ (−∞,+∞) and N is a large prime number.
Definition 6. The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP): DHP is defined as: two
different degree polynomials Tr(x) and Ts(x) are assumed, finding Trs(x) is
impossible without knowing r and s.
Definition 7. The discrete logarithm problem (DLP): DLP is defined as: an
element a is assumed, finding the integer r so that Tr(x) ≡ a is impossible.
2.2. Logistic chaotic map
One of the simplest chaotic maps is the Simple Logistic Function (SLF). It
can be expressed as:
xn+1 = λxn(1− xn), (8)
where, n = 0, 1, 2, 3, · · · , x0 ∈ [0, 1] is an initial value, xn the nth value in
the sequence, accordingly, xn+1 the n+ 1th term in the same sequence and
0 ≤ λ ≤ 4 the logistic map parameter. When we adjust the λ parameter
beyond 3.57, we see the onset of chaos. In fact, for a behavior to be chaotic, λ
should be between 3.57 and 4.
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2.3. Chinese remainder theorem
The Chinese remainder theorem or CRT for short, has been employed vastly
in cryptography. This algorithm hides data and is hypothetically designed as
a one-way function. The theorem is described as: suppose m1,m2, · · · ,mr are
positive integers that are pairwise co-prime numbers and a1, a2, · · · , ar is the
sequence of the given integers where:
x ≡ a1 mod m1
x ≡ a2 mod m2
...
x ≡ ar mod mr
(9)
Then x
mi≡ ai, i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , r has only one answer to the module M =∏r
i=1mi and equals:
X =
r∑
i=1
aiMiyi (10)
where, Mi =
M
mi
, yi = M
−1
i mod mi
3. Yoon-Jeon’s key agreement protocol based on Chebyshev chaotic
map
This section reviews the Yoon-Jeon protocol [9]. All the notations used in
the Yoon-Jeon protocol are described in Table 1. Assume Alice and Bob are
two participants in a key agreement process. In this system, Trent is a trusted
third party in the network, e.g., KDC (key distribution center) which publishes
the system parameters including Chebyshev polynomials, E(.), D(.), and H(.)
prior to the commencement of key agreement protocol and also shares a different
secret key with each participant. The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice selects a large integer r, a large prime number N , and a random
number x ∈ (−∞,+∞), and then computes Tr(x), where, Tr(x) is a n-
degree Chebyshev polynomial in x. She concatenates A, B, x, N and
Tr(x).
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Table 1: Notations used in Yoon-Jeon’s protocol
Symbol Definition
A,B Identifiers of Alice and Bob, respectively
TA, TB Shared secret key between Alice and Bob with Trent, respectively
Tn(x) Chebyshev polynomial in x of degree n
E(.) A symmetric encryption algorithm
D(.) An asymmetric decryption algorithm
H(.) A one-way hash function
K Finally established session key between Alice and Bob
2. Trent decrypts ETA(A,B, x,N, Tr(x)) and checks whether A is a valid
identity. If not, Trent stops here; otherwise, Trent concatenates B, A, x,
N and Tr(x) and encrypts them using the shared key with Bob and sends
ETB(B,A, x,N, Tr(x)) to Bob.
3. Having received the message, Bob decrypts the cipher-text and checks
whether B is his identity. If not, Bob stops here; otherwise, he se-
lects a large integer s and computes Ts(x)), the shared session key k =
Ts(Tr(x)), and the authentication value MACB = Hk(B,A, Tr(x)). Bob
sends Ts(x),MACB to Alice.
4. Alice computes the shared session key k = Tr(Ts(x)) and the same au-
thentication value MAC ′B = Hk(B,A, Tr(x)). Then, she checks whether
MACB and MAC
′
B are equal. If so, the Bob’s identity is authenticated.
Next, Alice calculates the authentication value MACA = Hk(B,A, Ts(x))
and sends it to Bob.
5. Having received the message, Bob computes MAC ′A = Hk(A,B, Ts(x))
and checks whether MACA and MAC
′
A are equal; if so, the identity of
Alice is authenticated.
Therefore, Alice and Bob have achieved the shared session key k = Tr(Ts(x)) =
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Ts(Tr(x)) = Trs(x) in order to protect the exchanged information in sub-
sequent communications.
An absolute trust in the key distribution center is presumed in the above
protocol. Private keys are issued by the key distribution center for the
server and users. Nevertheless, the possibility of encrypted message abuse
by the center exists, and it is clear that determining a trusted third party is
difficult. Each complete execution of the key agreement protocol requires
two encryptions and two decryptions. Also in the first step of the protocol,
the adversary can obtain the user’s ID, thereby compromising the true
identity of the user.
4. The proposed protocol
In this section, we introduce an efficient and secure key agreement protocol
based on chaotic maps which protects the users’ anonymity. It incorporates two
phases of registration and authentication-key agreement. The notations used in
our protocol are listed in Table 2.
1. Registration phase
(a) Ui chooses a large integer n, a random parameter λ over the interval[
3.57, 4
]
and an initial value x0 over the interval
[
0, 1
]
so as to gener-
ate the chaotic sequence A = (x0, x1, . . . , xn) using Logistic mapping.
She also selects a positive integer m1, a password pwi and a random
nonce ns. Now, she sends
{
IDi, a,m1, hpw
}
to the server over a se-
cure channel, where IDi is the identity, a sum of all the elements in
A and hpw = H(pwi, ns).
(b) Similar to the server Ui chooses a large integer n
′, a random pa-
rameter λ′ over the interval , an initial value x′0 over the interval[
0, 1
]
so as to generate the chaotic sequence B =
(
x′0, x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n
)
using logistic mapping. Having acquired b which is the sum of el-
ements in the chaotic sequence B, the server proceeds to obtain b′
and a′ by multiplying a and b by 10c and 10c
′
where c and c′ are
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Table 2: Notations used in our proposed protocol
Symbol Definition
Ui Some user i
IDi, IDs Identities of the user i and the server
pwi A password chosen by user i
ns, k Nonces chosen by user i
Mi Nonces chosen by the server
Tn(x) The Chebyshev polynomial in x of degree n
H(.) A one-way hash function
ski Finally established session key between the user i and the server
⊕ The exclusive-or operation
the decimal digits of a and b. Furthermore, the sever chooses the
positive integer m2 as mutually prime to m1. The server now uses
the Chinese remainder theorem to calculate X and having acquired
Ri = H
(
IDi, Hpw
)⊕H(X) and R1 = H(m2, hpw), chooses the ran-
dom sequence Mi and transmits the message
{
IDs,Mi, Ri, R1
}
over
a secure channel to the user with IDs identity. The registration phase
is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
2. Authentication-key agreement phase
(a) Ui selects a large integer r, a large prime N , and a random number
x ∈ ( −∞,+∞), and then computes Tr(x), a n-degree Chebyshev
polynomial in x. Then she computes the parameters below by choos-
ing a random nonce k.
M1 = Ri ⊕H(k)
AIDi = IDi ⊕H(k)
M2 = Tr(x)⊕R1
Finally, she transmits
{
Mi,M1,M2, AIDi, x,N
}
to the server.
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Figure 1: Registration phase of our protocol
(b) Upon receiving this message and seeingMi, the server searches for the
registered user to which this random nonce has been assigned. The
server finds Ri and R1 by receiving M1 and AIDi, computes H(k) =
Ri⊕M1 and ID′i = H(k)⊕AIDi. Furthermore, it examines if IDi ?=
ID∗i is true or not and in case it is, it establishes the authenticity
of the user, proceeding to acquire Tr(x) = M2 ⊕ R1 and this time,
chooses a large integer s so as to calculate Ts(x), the session key
ski = Ts
(
Tr(x)
)
and authentication value AUs = H
(
IDi, H(k), ski
)
.
Finally, the server transmits the message
{
IDs,M3, AUs
}
to the user
which is M3 = Ts(x)⊕H(x).
(c) The user obtains H(x) = Ri⊕H
(
IDi, hpw
)
and Ts(x) = M3⊕H(x)
which enables him/her to compute the session key ski = Tr(Ts(x))
and the server authentication value AUs
′ = H
(
IDi, H(k), ski
)
by
using the previously acquired Ts(x) and possessing Tr(x), which was
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calculated in the first step of the authentication-key agreement phase.
She examines the accuracy of AU ′s
?
= AUs and the correct case es-
tablishes the identity of server. Then, she computes her own authen-
tication value AUi = H
(
IDs, H(k), ski
)
.
(d) Having received the message, the server computesAUi′ = H
(
IDs, H(k), ski
)
and examines the accuracy of AUi
′ ?= AUi, and if it is accurate, the
identity of user i is established. Now that the mutual authentica-
tion between the user and the server is established, the key ski =
Tr(Ts(x)) = Ts(Tr(x)) is used as the shared secret key between these
two participants.
5. Analysis of the proposed protocol
The performance and security of the proposed protocol is now studied. The
theory analysis demonstrates that the offered key agreement protocol is secure
and efficient.
1. Security analysis
(a) Bergamo et al.’s attack [3]
This attack is possible under two conditions. First, an attacker is to
acquire the related parameters x, Tr(x) and Ts(x), second, if several
Chebyshev polynomials cross the same crossing point, due to the pe-
riodicity of cosine functions, the adversary would be able to recover
the encrypted text. In the proposed protocol, Tr(x) and Ts(x) are
substituted within M2 = Tr(x)⊕R1 and M3 = Ts(x)⊕H(x), respec-
tively. Adversaries are not able to acquire these polynomials without
knowing R1 and H(x) which are transferred to the user over a secure
channel. Besides, the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials employed in
this protocol render Bergamo et al.’s attack impossible.
(b) Man-in-the-middle attack
In the suggested protocol, an adversary cannot forge authentic mes-
sages, because users and the server analyze received messages during
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protocol performance. Then, in the third step of the authentication-
key agreement phase, user verifies the authenticity of the server
AUs = H(IDi, H(k), ski), and next, the server verifiesAUi = H(IDs, H(k), ski).
Therefore, our protocol is able to prevent these forms of attack. The
authentication-key agreement phase is illustrated in figure 2 below.
(c) Replay attack
It is a form of network attack, in which a valid data transmission is
maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is carried out
either by the originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data
and retransmits it. The adversary eavesdrops on the conversation
and having acquired the necessary information such as the user-name
and password from the session, sends the password (or hash). For
instance, supposing that the user Ui wants to prove his/her identity
to the server, the server requests the password as a proof of identity,
which the user dutifully provides probably after some transformation
like a hash function; meanwhile an adversarial third party is eaves-
dropping on their conversation and keeps the password. After the in-
terchange is over, the adversary (posing as the user) connects to the
server; and when asked for a proof of identity, sends the user’s pass-
word (or hash) read from the last session, which the server accepts
thus granting access to the adversarial third party. Ways to avoid
replay attacks include using one-time passwords, (pseudo-) randomly
generated strings (nonce), and time-stamping.
In our key agreement protocol’s authentication step, to prevent such
attacks, the ends of the communication system are supposed to con-
firm parts of the received messages. Second, the server acquires
ID∗i = H(k)⊕AIDi and confirms the authenticity of the user. Third,
the user Ui, after receiving the message
{
IDs,M3, AUs
}
identifies
the server and having found Ri in its database, obtains H(X) =
Ri ⊕ H
(
IDi, hpw
)
, Ts = M3 ⊕ H(x) and skiTr(Ts(x)), thus en-
abled to confirm the authentication key. Then, the server confirms
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AUi = H(IDs, H(k), ski) and all the communicated messages are
different because the numbers and random strings R, S and K are
rapidly changing in the protocol, therefore the adversary fails in any
attempt.
This protocol is vulnerable to attack, mainly because no solution
has been offered for authenticity assurances that would affirm the
messages origin. In the first step of the authentication-key agreement
phase of the proposed protocol, M1 , M2 and AIDi are different in
each execution, because random nonce k and random number r are
chosen by the user in each execution. In the second and third steps,
M3, AUs and AUi are chosen differently in each execution because
the random numbers r, s and ski, H(k) are refreshed. As a result,
the replay attack does not work.
(d) Mutual authentication
In the protocol’s authentication-key agreement’s thrid step, the server’s
identity is verified by examining the equality of AU ′s and AUs , be-
cause only one authorized server is able to compute AUs. Further-
more, in forth step, the server verifies the user by examining the
equation AUi
′ ?= AUi. Because only the authorized user is capable
of computing AUi. Thus, the server and user reach mutual authen-
tication.
(e) Perfect forward secrecy
This property of key agreement protocols ensures that compromise
of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys. It protects
past sessions against future compromises of secret keys. The session
keys are dependent upon random numbers r and s, which are inac-
cessible to adversaries. The protocol is seen as an important security
feature.
(f) Known session key secrecy
The key agreement protocols are supposed to be dynamic so that
each execution results in a unique session key. This feature ensures
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that if an adversary could access a session key, she would be unable to
recover the other session keys. Thus, supposing an adversary could
obtain a secret session key between the user and server, she would
not be able to compute the other session keys because the adversary
would face DHP and DLP . In addition, the created session keys are
chosen by the user and the server, dependent upon random numbers
of r and s, so they would be different in each protocol execution.
Thus, the inability of an adversary to gain random numbers of r
and s, makes the session keys unattainable. Clearly, the proposed
protocol satisfies this need.
(g) Privileged insider attack
Adversaries frequently guess weak passwords using password cracker
applications, which make attempts at guessing the passwords by us-
ing particular algorithms and keyword dictionaries. One of the most
common and biggest mistakes is choosing one password for all ac-
counts. In the first step of the proposed protocol, the user i chooses
a random nonce ns while computing hpw = H(pwi, ns), transmits it
to the server, and hpw is substituted in R1 = H(m2, hpw) from the
second step of the registration phase. It is impossible for a malicious
server to guess the hpw password without identifying the random
nonce ns, even if the user selected a weak password pwi that is easier
to remember.
(h) User anonymity
In insecure environments such as e-commerce, e-banking, and tele-
care medicine information systems, when the users intend to agree
upon a mutual key session with the server, they also wish to remain
anonymous. Therefore, protecting the privacy of users is crucial in
such environments, and the key agreement protocols are supposed to
be designed in a way to make it impossible for an adversary to extract
the identity of users by eavesdropping on conversations between the
users and the server. Supposing that an adversary was capable of
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eavesdropping on all the transmitted messages, he would be able to
learn about the true identity of the user. During transmission of the
first message in the authentication-key agreement phase, even if the
adversary eavesdrops on the message
{
Mi,M1,M2, AIDi, x,N
}
, he
still will not be able to obtain IDi because it is integrated into the
equation AIDi = IDi⊕H(k), and the adversary is faced to deal with
the one-way function H(k) for which he would not have the adequate
time to break. Furthermore, k is a random string, changing in each
execution of the protocol. In the second message
{
IDs,M3, AUs
}
,
IDi is placed in the equation AUs = H
(
IDi, H(k), ski
)
in which the
adversary has to break the impenetrable one-way function, there-
fore the true identity of the user remains protected and anonymous.
The adversaries are unable to access the true identity of users, be-
cause their identities are substituted in AIDi = IDi ⊕ H(k) and
AUs = H
(
IDi, H(k), ski
)
. Since the random nonce k is chosen by
users in each protocol execution, adversaries are not capable of guess-
ing a big random nonce and are faced with a one-way hash function
so IDi is beyond access, and as a result the anonymity of users is
protected.
(i) Server impersonation by insider users
In this proposed protocol, the server, having received a and M1 from
the user i, chooses b and m2 proceeds to compute H(x) by using
the Chinese remainder theorem. H(x) is not the long-term key of
all users and is considered unique for each user in the registration
phase, making it impossible for insiders to access the other users’
H(x), preventing them from introducing themselves as the server.
2. Performance analysis
In this subsection, we compare the suggested protocol with the other pro-
tocols which have been offered recently. The number of performed oper-
ations in this protocol perfectly accounts for the amount of computation
and the required amount of time for its execution. The less is the compu-
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tation time is, the shorter the protocol execution. Therefore, the protocol
with lesser computational complexity is more practical. A comparison of
the computation time of the proposed protocol with the other associated
protocols are provided in table 3. The parameters below are given for
easier performance evaluation.
TH : Computation time of hash function
TX : Computation time of XOR
TE : Computation time of symmetric encryption algorithm
TD: Computation time of symmetric decryption algorithm
TCM : Computation time of Chebyshev chaotic map
In regard to the information in table 3, N/A refers to not requiring a
trusted third party and the computation time of operators are calculated
based on the execution time of the hash function. The time complexity of
a XOR operation in comparison with that of hash function can easily be
disregarded; the other costs calculated TE ≈ 2.5TH , TD ≈ 2.5TH , TCM ≈
175TH [18]. The number of computational executions (encryption and
decryption computations, Chebyshev chaotic map, Hash and XOR func-
tions) in key agreement level for the proposed algorithms is calculated.
In order to conduct a practical analysis to make a reasonable comparison
between protocols, it is required that all operational units are presented as
one, therefore, the operational complexity of units is calculated according
to the Hash function.
Based on the table, it is clear that the amount of computations in the pro-
posed protocol in compariosn to related protocols has decreased, and there
is no need for encryption and decryption computations, which resulting in
efficiency improvement.
It is understandable from the security analysis that our proposed protocol
does not suffer from complexity issues in encryption/decryption operations
due to using XOR and Hash functions along with the Chebyshev chaotic
map. Other protocols utilize encryption in transmission of their mes-
sages. Each encryption/decryption computation includes several Hashing
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Table 3: Performance comparison of key agreement protocols
Proposed schemes Cost of each user Cost of trusted third party Cost of the server Total time
Tseng-Jon [13] TX + 3TH + 2TCM + TE + TD TX + TH + TCM + 2TE + 2TD 2TH + TCM + TE + TD 726TH
Niu-Wang [11] 2TH + 2TCM + TE + TD 2TE + 2TD 2TH + TCM + TE + TD 724TH
Yoon-Jeon [9] 2TH + 2TCM + TE TE + TD 2TH + TCM + TD 714TH
He et al [16] 2TX + 4TH + 3TCM N/A 3TX + 4TH + 3TCM + TD 958TH
Lee et al [15] 6TX + 7TH + 2TCM N/A 6TX + 5TH + 2TCM 712TH
Lee-Hsu [19] 5TX + 10TH + 3TCM N/A 3TX + 7TH + 3TCM 967TH
Our proposed protocol 5TX + 4TH + 2TCM N/A 4TX + 2TH + 2TCM 706TH
and XOR operations. It is clear that all such protocols are afflicted with
complexity issues and require more execution time than the proposed pro-
tocol.
6. Conclusion
Since reaching to a certain satisfying level of security with minimum com-
putations in designing a protocol is of great importance, we offer a secure and
practical protocol based on chaotic maps. In this protocol, we take advantage of:
the semi-group property of Chebyshev chaotic map for session key agreement be-
tween two participants, the logistic chaotic map for generating non-predictable
and pseudo-random sequences, and the Chinese remainder theorem as a one-way
theorem. The proposed protocol, in addition to better performance, reduces the
setbacks inherent with previous related protocols such as non-anonymity and it
does not require the presence of a trusted third party since this element holds
the potential to introduce vulnerability. Furthermore, the implementation cost
of a trusted third party and complex structure of these protocols are considered
the main impediments of utilizing a third party in design and development of
key agreement protocols. Thus, the presented protocol has proved to maintain
a balance between security and implementation cost.
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